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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COMMENTARY

Ralph Michael Stein*
During the past year, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided a number of significant appeals involving constitutional issues. As is generally the case, most of the issues
presented to the Second Circuit were also under judicial scrutiny
in other federal appellate courts. Four first amendment cases decided by the court - three dealing primarily with freedom of
religion and a fourth with freedom of the press - are particularly noteworthy and merit review.

A. That Crsche in Scarsdale
Believing that both freedom of speech and freedom of religion were transcendental concerns, the architects of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution placed the tmo
subjects together as the first guarantees in the Bill of Rights.l
While a plain reading of the amendment would suggest that the
two subject areas - speech and religion - were discrete, contemporary first amendment litigation often results in a fusing of
these two areas of constitutional concern. Such a situation was
encountered in McCreary v. Stone?
In mid-1984, the Second Circuit, without dissent, reversed
the district court in McCreary v. Stone, a case of some public
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Lnw. The nuthor ndmowledges with appreciation the aid of research assistant Anne Schnible and the antributions of Donald L. Singer, Class of 1985, in Constitutional Low Seminnr Nine-0.
See L BRANT,
THE BILLOF RIGHTS:ITS ORIGIN
AND ~ ~ N D I G passim
,
(1965).
739 F.2d 716 (2d Ci. 1984). afd by an equally diuided Cowt sub nom Board of
Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
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controversy and also a case fairly typical of recent challenges in
courts throughout the United States to publicly supported and
often publicly financed displays of religious symbols in public
places. McCreary v. Stone was ffirmed without an opinion by
an equally divided Supreme Court on March 27, 1985.3In view
of this disposition, the analysis of the three-judge Second Circuit
bench4 is of interest.
Big constitutional issues from little local issues grow. The
background of McCreary is a story of traditional local government practices confronted by shifts in constituency and the inexorable impact of evolving first amendment doctrine even in
the smallest villages. The Village of Scarsdale (Scarsdale), a municipal corporation: is located in Westchester County north of
New York City. Scarsdale6 owns a small park called Boniface
Circle, "located in the center of the business district of
Scarsdale."'
Two separate actions were brought in 1983 to compel Scarsdale's Board of Trustees to permit the continued display of a
creche during the Christmas season. These lawsuits were the culmination of a history of permitted display, followed by doubts as
to the constitutionality of the display, followed by a refusal to
permit the creche in the future. It was this refusal by the Board
of Trustees that led directly to the commencement of the actions in the district court.8

Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985). Justice Powell did not
participate in the decision. Id.
McCreary was before Judges Mansfield, Pierce and Pratt in the Second Circuit.
McCreary, 739 F.2d a t 718. The village has about 17,000 residents, who elect local
government through a non-partisan system. Id.
Scarsdale and Scarsdale Post Office cover two political entities. The Village of
Scarsdale is a municipal corporation, while parts of the contiguous post office of Scarsdale, N.Y., are within the political jurisdiction of the Town of Greenburgh. Although it
is not clear from the opinion, some of the plaintiffs appear to have Scarsdale Post Office,
instead of Scarsdale Village, addresses. As this was never raised, it was not at issue in
this suit. It may be, however, that one or more of the individual plaintiffs lnckod standing to bring an action protesting a decision by the Village of Scarsdale authorities.
McCreary, 739 F.2d a t 717.
The Citizens' Group, consisting of 17 Scarsdale residents, commenced an action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on February 7,
1983, after the Scarsdale authorities denied their application to place a creche at Boniface Circle. The Creche Committee commenced its action on April28,1983 in the same
fonun. The two actions raised the same issues and ultimately were consolidatcd. Id. at
721-22.
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A creche, depicting the birth of Christ? was first installed in
Scarsdale's Boniface Circle in 1956.1° A Creche Committee composed of Scarsdale churches," later a plaints in one of the actions in this controversy, was responsible for commissioning the
sculpting of the wood-carved creche itself and its placement and
maintenance in Boniface Circle each Christmas season. No public money financed the sculpting of the creche.12 The Second
Circuit detailed the history of the Scarsdale creche display as
follows:
In each year from 1957 through 1982, t h e Creche Committee submitted a m i t t e n application to t h e Board seeking permission to display its creche at Boniface Circle during the Christmas season; from
1957 through 1972, the Board unanimously granted the Committee's
applications; from 1973 through 1980, the Board granted the Committee's applications, b u t minority votes of abstention or denial marked
t h e grants. In 1981 a n d 1982, t h e Board voted 4-3 to deny t h e Committee's requests to diiplay its creche at Boniface C i r ~ l e . ' ~

Beginning in 1976 the Board of Trustees required the sponsors of the Christmas exhibit to diiplay a sign indicating their
sponsorship of the cr&che.14In both 1979 and 1980, the Board of
Trustees, while continuing to sanction display of the crache, recOther seasonal decorations seem to have accompanied the d c h e displny during
the years that the Scarsdale Trustees permitted the display. Id. a t 719. However, the
McCreary plaintiffs apparently had nothing to do with them. Therefore, unlilie plaintias
in other creche cases, advocates of the Scarsdale display could not and did not clnim thnt
their diiplay was in any sense "softened" by related material.
lo Id. a t 720.
l1 The Scarsdale churches brought this action as the Creche Committee nnd not m
individual houses of worship. The Cr6che Committee is a private unincorporatednssociation of seven Catholic and Protestant churches in the Scarsdale area. Id. nt 718.
l2 Id. a t 720. Though speculative, it is worth considering whether the court of nppeals would have taken a more stringent view of the Creche Committee's position had
they not been joined by a Citizens' Group. Without the involvement of the Citizens'
Group, the argument for display is more S t r a i g h f f ~ ~ a rnd :group of Chrktian churches
asserting the right to place a quintessentially religious symbol on public property to celebrate a major religious holiday central to the beliefs of church membera This is a factor
distinguishing McCreary from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See text accompanying note 24 infra.
l9 McCreary, 739 F.2d at 720.
l4 Id. The sign read: '
Thiscreche has been erected and mnintained solely by the
Scarsdale Creche Committee, a private organization." During ornl nryment before the
Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor expressed the view that the sign mitigated the dnnger
t&t the public would attribute sponsorship of the creche to Scimdnle. Coumd for the
53
Scarsdale Board of Trustees responded: "But i t has the appearance of sp0~oF8hip.~
U.S.L.W. 3627 (Mar. 5. 1985).
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ommended to the Creche Committee that they find another location in the future.'$ The trustees' repeated, strong recommendations reflected the growing divisiveness engendered by the
creche.
In December 1982, a group of Scarsdale residentsl0 sought
permission to place a new, smaller creche in Boniface Circle to
replace the one displayed in previous years.17 Their request was
denied by the Board of Trustees, and these local residents (denominated the Citizens' Group) brought an action against Scarsdale and its trustees in February 1983?8 In April 1983, following
the denial of its application to place the creche in Boniface Circle for the 1983 Christmas season, the Creche Committee also
sued Scarsdale and the trustees.19 Because the two actions were
virtually identical, United States District Judge Stewart consolidated them.20 The defendants argued that placement of the
creche violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.
The district judge agreed and found in favor of Scarsdale and its
trustees on all issues.21Both the Creche Committee and the Citizens' Group appealed to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit
reversed the district court and remanded "for the entry of an
injunction prohibiting the Village from relying on the establishment clause as a reason for prohibiting the erection of a creche
l6 McCreary, 739 F.2d a t 721. In 1979, the Scarsdale authorities "strongly recommended" and in 1980 "strongly urge[d]" that the creche be relocated to private property.
I t must be assumed, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the trustees were discharging their duties in the public interest. There is no indication that any of the trustees who
questioned placement of the creche on public property were subject to political pressure.
Although they did not deal directly with the issue, the reported district and circuit court
opinions permit the inference that the Scarsdale community generally supported the
trustees' actions. Otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the Citizens' Group and the
Creche Committee would have raised this point. On the other hand, the expression of
rights protected by the first amendment must not depend on majority views. In the establishment clause area, entanglement is not always conspicuous. Thus, the apparent
lack of pretext for the trustees' recommendation does not by itself indicate the absence
of impermissible entanglement.
le Id.
I7 Id.
l8 Id. While the Citizens' Group sought damages in this action, i t is clear that the
gravamen of their demand for relief was an injunction enjoining Scarsdale authorities
from preventing plaintiffs' use of Boniface Circle for their creche display.
lo Id. a t 722.
ao Id.
Id. a t 722-23. "The case was tried on July 20, 1983, upon a record consisting entirely of stipulated facts, depositions, answers to interrogatories and documentary evidence." Id. a t 722.
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at Boniface Circle."**
Circuit Judge Pierce, writing for the Second Circuit bench,
noted that
[tlhe principal issue before us on appeal is whether the VilIage's content-based denials of the applications to display a creche for a period
of approximately two weeks during the Christmas holiday season at
Boniface Circle, a traditional public forum, were necessary in order to
serve a compelling state interest of avoiding contravention of the establishment clause of the Grst amendmenLm

The court went on to find that "the district court at that time
did not have the benefit of Lynch v. D~nrrelly,"~~
a crgche case
recently decided by the Supreme Court. Further, the Second
Circuit found that Judge Stewart had incorrectly analyzed
Widmar v. Vin~ent*~
in reaching its conclusion. This author
maintains that the district court did not misconstrue "Widmar
in light of Lynch"26 and that, in any event, McCreary can and
should be distinguished from Lynch.
Lynch was decided by the Supreme Court in March 1984 by
a five-to-four vote. This nationally publicized action involved an
establishment clause challenge to the erection by a municipal
corporation, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, of a Christmas display, including a crkche, in a private park." Like Scarsdale, Pawtucket had long permitted the Christmas display:8 and
concern about its constitutionality had emerged only in recent
years. Unlike Scarsdale, Pawtucket funded the display. The district court in Lynch upheld the plaintiffs' claims that the establishment clause forbade such a municipdy sponsored and
funded display of a c r b ~ h e . ~ ~
29 Id. at 730. While the Second Circuit ordered the V i e not to rely on the e3tnblishment clause to block the creche display in the future, it is not clear whether there
exists any additional basis for refusing to &ow the display of a religious 8!fmbOl on public property. Counsel for Scarsdale argued before the Supreme Court thnt the Second
Circuit had, in effect, aflkmatively ordered display of the creche in Bonifnce Cirde. 53
U.S.L.W. 3627 (Mar. 5, 1985). When Justice O'Connor objected to tbnt chnrncterhtion
of the Second Circuit's opinion, counsel retorted. "None of the perties hive seen it os
anything else [than an order directing display of the creche]." Id. at 3628.
hlccreary, 739 F.2d at 723.
24 Id. (citing Lynch v. Domelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
O0 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
28 McCreary, 739 F.2d at 723.
O1 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
* Id. The record shows that the practice was ongoing for forty or more pars. Id.
P9 DonneUy v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.RL 1981), afd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.
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By a narrow margin, the Supreme Court, in a somewhat meandering opinion highlighted by references to irrelevant consideration~:~overturned the district COUI%'S determination. The
Court's main concern was the contextual setting of the creche
rather than its innate identity as a religious symbol. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that "[iln this case, the
focus of our inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the
Christmas season."31 Noting that the district court had concluded that the religious nature of a creche was in itself evidence
of a lack of secular purpose, Chief Justice Burger continued:
[The district court] rejected the City's claim that its reasons for including the creche are essentially the same as its reasons for sponsoring the display as a whole. The District Court plainly erred by focusing almost exclusively on the crBche. When viewed in the proper
context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent that, on this
record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of
the crBche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind
of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message.8a

While suggesting that challengers of government practices
supposedly violative of the establishment clause must meet a
new test by proving - almost literally
a holy conspiracy to
advance or support religion, the Chief Justice also found that
the Pawtucket practice had a secular purpose. "The display is
sponsored by the City to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the
origins of that H ~ l i d a y . "The
~ ~ Court did not address the question of whether the Pawtucket display highlighted the origin of
Christmas as a religious event or of Christmas as an American

-

19821, reu'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
30 See, e.g., 465 U.S. a t 674-78. In attempting to outline a basis for its decision, tho
Court discussed a number of prior cases which have little or no relationship t o tho spocia1 establishment clause issues raised by the public display of religious symbols. Whilo
the use of history may illuminate and help to explain an opinion, the Court's all too
frequent harking back to the first Thanksgiving, id. a t 675, and its references to thu
holdings of the National Gallery, id. a t 676, served no analytic purpose.
Id. a t 679. Had the Pawtucket or the Scaredale creches featured the slogan "Koop
Christ in Christmas," would the Court have examined the creche merely "in tho context
of the Christmas season"? Probably only with the greatest difficulty. Such n sign would
make the cr8che's innate religious symbolism unmistakable. What the Court ignorod,
however, is that religious symbols traditionally convey spiritual values without n neod for
words. Thus, its conclusion that "in the context of the Christmas season" nobody would
give a religious interpretation to a creche is singularly anti-religious.
52 Id. a t 680.
Id. a t 681.
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holiday for all. There is a differen~e.~'The Court's per curiam
affirmance of McCreary did not shed further light on the
question.36
Widmar u. V i n ~ e n t , 3upon
~ which the district court in McCreary also relied, presents different issues from those raised in
Lynch. In Widmar, the University of Missouri a t Kansas City
had promulgated a regulation that denied to religious groups the
use of campus facilities that were available to nonreligious
groups. The defendant university, in an action brought by a
number of students belonging to a religious organization, maintained that its primary concern in enacting the challenged regulation was to ensure church-state separation pursuant to the
mandate of the establishment clause.37 The Supreme Court, in
rejecting the school's regulation, found that "an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would
have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with relig i ~ n . "The
~ ~ Supreme Court further noted that "an open forum

" The Supreme Court's reasoning in Lynch does nothing to resolve the problem of n
municipality that uses a display to celebrate the true origins of Chriitmns. In thnt case,
the municipality is certainly engaged in impermissible conduct. If, on the other hnnd, the
historical origins of the American celebration of Chriitmas are to be highlighted, n neutral museum-like exhibit would be constitutionally unobjectionnble, even if it included n
cross or crgche. Such exhibits are by their nnture informntive nnd educntionnl, nnd this
quality justifies governmental sponsorship of them. There is no indimtion, however, thnt
the Pawtucket creche was intended to be informative.
" Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. CL 1859 (1985) (per curinm).
The Second Circuit relied heavily on Lynch when it reversed the district court's
finding that Scarsdale's content-based denials of the Cr+che Committee's nppliations
were proper. See McCreary, 739 F.2d a t 724-27. The court's opinion e m p h n s i i Lynch's
ruling that there was no primary advancement of religion even if Pnwtucket nppeved to
have aligned itself with Christianity by permitting the creche diiplny on municipal property. Id. at 727.
" 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Id. at 270. Many sectarian groups on college campuses today nre viewed either ns
"fringe" organizations or, in some instances, as heretical by observers of trnditionnl religious practices. In Widmar, the university, probably correctly, sow itself ns n logid nnd
inevitable target of litigation by those who opposed the use of university property by
sectarian groups. The reluctance of universities to become involved in such litigntion has
led to the adoption of regulations such as the University of hlissouri's, vihich prohibit
sectarian group use of campus facilities. Because state university officinle nre more directly accountable, generally, to legislators than they are to the public, it is underatnndnble if not commendable that they so often take a safe path. Hor;ever, the Constitution
not only does not command them to do so, but on examinntion, it probably forbids them
to do so. This is another factor militating against a broad applicntion of Widmar to
McCreary.
UL Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted).
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in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of State
approval on religious sects or practi~es."~~
The significance of Widmar is that, in an institution of
higher education, the mere use by religious student groups of
facilities otherwise available to nonreligious student groups does
not lead to an inference of governmental support for religion or
for any particular religious group.'O While, without doubt,
Widmar results in incidental benefits to those religious groups
seeking the use of campus facilities, the Court has often stated
that mere incidental benefits do not violate the Constitution." It
is hard to read Widmar without coming to the conclusion that
the Supreme Court was restricting its discussion to the issue of
open access as it applied to state-sponsored institutions of
higher learning.42 Widmar is cited in Lynch solely for the proposition that indirect or incidental benefits to religion do not
ips0 facto invalidate laws;4s in addition, the Court in Lynch referred to Widmar only after discussing another case that more
directly stood for the proposition it f~llowed."~
Before proceeding~~to
a doctrinal analysis of the Second Circuit's reliance on both Widmar and Lynch, it is useful to mark
the clear factual distinctions between Widmar and Lynch, on
the one hand, and McCreary on the other. Lynch, as previously
indicated, involved the use of private property by a municipality. In Lynch, the municipal but privately owned corporation argued for the placement of the creche in a conspicuous public but
privately owned place. The Pawtucket civic authorities argued
that their display was essentially and inherently secular because
it, together with other nonreligious symbols, marked the celebration of a legal holiday.46The Pawtucket display was maintained
by the city, and the creche was only one part of a larger dis-

Id. at 273.
See id. at 274 ("[Aln open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices, just as it does not imply State
approval of political views espoused by campus groups utilizing campus facilities.").
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 766,
771 (1973) ("not every law that confers 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' bonefit upon
religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid").
" See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14, 276 n.20.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
** Id. (discussing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
' 6 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-84.
30

'O
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play.46Further, as Justice Blackmun pungently noted in his dissenting opinion, a concomitant secular purpose of the crhche in
Pawtucket was commercial exploitation of a religious holiday, a
goal apparently subscribed to by the city a ~ t h o r i t i e s . ~ ~
Other aspects of the factual setting of McCreary are demonstrably and, from the standpoint of legal analysis, significantly
different from Lynch. Proponents of the creche in Boniface Circle were a coalition of churches and a group of citizens, some of
whom were probably also members of the church group.J8 The
record in McCreary does not indicate any serious argument
raised by plaintiffs that a secular purpose was the main inspiration for the yearly creche display. Instead, as w i l l be discussed,
the arguments of the pro-creche group in Scarsdale implicitly
acknowledged the essentially religious nature of their display.JB
Thus, in terms of factual distinctions alone, there was no
strong basis, let alone an imperative, for the Second Circuit
panel to apply Lynch to McCreary. The district court opinion in
McCreary presented a clear statement of the facts upon which
the court's judgment was predicated. Judge Stewart's opinion
could have been, and should have been, assessed on the basis of
relevant first amendment cases. Lynch, however, was not relevant because its facts differed so markedly from those of IllcCreary. Consequently, it should not have been viewed as analytically controlling.
Widmar can also be distinguished factually from IllcCreary.
The Second Circuit applied Widmar for its stated truism that
denial of the university's establishment clause claim does not
negate the possibility of reasonable time, place and manner regu l a t i o n ~ .However,
~~
the Second Circuit's reliance on Widmar

Id. a t 671. Included in the display were, dong with Jesus, hlnry, and Joseph,
"angels, shepherds, kings, and animals, all ranging in height from 5" to 5'." Id.
Id. a t 726-27. See also Justice Brennan's dissent, in which be rejected Pnritucket's
argument that commercial purposes were of su£Ecient seculnr ~ e i g b to
t overcome any
establishment clause problem. Id. a t 698-701 (Brennnn, J., dissenting).
A possible affinity of membership between the tsvo plnintiff groups should hnve
been, but apparently was not, determined by the district court.
Unlike those in Lynch, the theory of the creche advocates in hfcCreory atas thnt
Scarsdale was legally bound not to discriminate on content-bnsed grounds in d c n ~ t i n g
space in Boniface Circle. McCreory, 739 F.2d a t 722. The Scnrsdnle &e
proponents
argued that their right of access to the public area was no grenter and no less thm that
of nonreligious affiliated org&tions.
Id. a t 722-23.
Id. a t 724.
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for this principle was inapposite. The Widmar Court reassured
universities that expanding equal access to religious groups in no
way imperiled the institutions' basic right to control their own
facilities, a control that is obviously vital when many groups
seek the use of limited facilities. Non-content-focused time,
place and manner regulation of access to university facilities is
not a constitutional rule so much as it is a recognition of practicalities and social reality.61
No Widmar parallel can be found in McCreary. The creche
had been displayed a t Boniface Circle for several decades, and
the Citizens' Group and the Creche Committee both wished to
continue using that, and no other, public facility.6a This is evident from the fact that the creche sponsors had rejected requests, which later amounted to pleas by the Scarsdale authorities, that they relocate to private property. With respect to time,
the creche sponsors were interested in displaying their exhibit
only a t Christmas time, as they had in the past. Flexibility was
not an issue in McCreary because of the nature of the exhibit;
hence the free speech rules relating to manner do not apply. McCreary, as Lynch, ineluctably comes to the question of creche or
no creche. Unlike typical first amendment free speech disputes,
which may allow for both negotiation and adjustment, McCreary
forces the question as to the inherent permissibility of a creche
on public property. Thus, Widmar is largely irrelevant, a fact
the Second Circuit apparently did not comprehend.
B. The Lemon Standard
The Second Circuit, following its discussion of Lynch and
6
' There is also a clear difference between college administrators discharging their
functions on campus and elected officials representing a political constituency. Whereas
college administrators have fiduciary responsibilities to the students who attund those
institutions, elected officials take an oath to uphold the Constitution and hence have a
specific obligation to prevent first amendment abuses of religion. Moreover, there is a
general recognition that institutions of higher education should not be regulated to the
degree that, say, public high schools are.
OB McCreary, 739 F.2d a t 721. The proponents of public display wanted to place the
creche in Boniface Circle, probably because of the Circle's central location in the Scarsdale business district. Id. a t 719. On a t least one occasion in 1981, the Creche Committee
accepted an offer to place its display on the grounds of Scarsdale's Frog Prince Proper
Restaurant. Id. a t 721. Apparently this was not a satisfactory solution for the Crilche
Committee. There was no evidence that Committee members were willing to consider a
location other than Boniface Circle.
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Widmar as precedents, stated that the controlling case for analyzing defendants' establishment clause argument in McCreary
was Lemon v. K u r t ~ r n a n As
. ~ ~summarized by Judge Pierce:
The Lemon test asks whether governmental conduct in an establishment-clause case has a secular purpose, whether the principal or primary effect of that conduct advances or inhibits religion and whether
the conduct will foster an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion
It is settled that if one prong of the test is breached, the
challenged governmental conduct will violate the establishment clause
. . The Lemon test generally has guided courts in the establishment-clause area.
although the Supreme Court has warned that in
this area it will not be bound by a single testM

... .

. .

..

With respect to the first, or "secular purpose" prong of the
Lemon test, the Second Circuit agreed with District Judge Stewart that Widmar applied, at least insofar as that case considers
"equal access for religious as well as nonreligious speech" to be
an acceptable secular purpose.66 However, Widmar speaks in
terms of pursuing a policy of an open forum to all comers, a
concept especially suited to state educational institutions, which
generally reflect a number of ethnic, economic, religious, political and social constituencies. Although not specifically defined,
the forum atmosphere encouraged by Widmar is aimed a t stimulating ideas and debate as part of the learning experience. A
criiche, by contrast, is a symbol designed not to inspire debate
but to awaken religious sentiment. Widmar's holding regarding
speech, therefore, would not seem to apply to a religious symbol.
A more significant issue is that of entanglement -the third
prong of the Lemon test. In McCreary, the Second Circuit correctly noted that "the Village's involvement here would be far
less than the involvement' of Pawtucket, the sponsor of the
creche in L y n ~ h . "The
~ ~ appellate court also supported the district court's finding that "the potential-political-divisiveness
part of the [Lemon] excessive-entanglement prong was insuf5* 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This case concerned state efforts to provide significant nid to
pre-college parochial schools. In a landmark opinion, the Court a n a l a d the realpolitik
of involving the state in the educational operations of sectarian schwls, and it struck
down statutes of two states authorizing grants to parochial schwls for expenses incuned
in providing instruction in secular subjects.
McCreary, 739 F.2d at 725 (citations omitted).
= Id.
" Id.
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cient to constitute an establishment-clause violation,"G7 The
Second Circuit noted that "Lynch specifically limited the potential-political-divisiveness part of the excessive-entanglement
prong to cases involving direct subsidies to church-sponsored
schools, colleges or other religious institution^."^^ The author
would argue that both the district and the appellate courts
missed the real entanglement issue here. The so-called "potential-political-divisiveness" that might be created is essentially
the product of feelings about the open display of religious symbols on public land. The real divisiveness issue has to do with
deep and genuine religious concerns that cannot be brushed
aside by suggestions that divisiveness only arises in cases involving government subsidies to religious institutions. The potential
divisiveness acknowledged by the court becomes actual,
profound and religious, in addition to being simply political,
with the sanctioning of the display on the ground that no establishment clause problem is p r e ~ e n t e d . ~ ~
The Second Circuit noted in McCreary that "[iln reality,
when evaluating an application for display of a creche, the Village will have to do no more than when evaluating any other
request for access to its public proper tie^."^^ Would that it were
so simple. By permitting public display of a symbol of seminal
importance to a major religion, the Second Circuit is, in effect,
virtually denying Scarsdale any right to reject any religious symId. (citations omitted).
Id. a t 726 (citations omitted). The political divisiveness issue is deceptively simple. As the Court noted in Lemon, the mere existence of aid programs to sectarian
schools awakens discord which, by itself, injects the state deeply into religious aITairs.
The pluralistic nature of American society, coupled with a history of uneasy mutual accommodation of religious beliefs, thrusts potential political divisiveness forward as a test
of entanglement.
These are issues that will not die or simply go away. At most, denial of the right
to use public property for the display of patently religious symbols results in attempts to
have the original determination set aside or overruled. By contrast, granting permission
to use public property would seem, a t least impressionistically, to foment much greater
divisiveness and to stoke a debate that the first amendment seeks to avoid. Every use of
public property for the display of religious symbols engenders some form of entangloment, albeit of a constitutionally insignificant level in some instances. The dangers of
entanglement are often greater than the claimed benefits of permitting an intermingling
of church and state. It is d i i c u l t to believe that protecting the partly secular purpose of
encouraging Christmas sales with a creche display is of the same level of magnitude ns
ensuring church-state separation.
60 739 F.2d a t 725. The Supreme Court's "affirmance" does nothing to curb the
court's decision.
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bol, whatever the message conveyed by the proposed display."'
The religious divisiveness inherent in any pluralistic society,
which is not necessarily a negative tension, thus can become a
political battleground. Government may be neutral with regard
to a particular faith or religious display, but under Lynch and
McCreary it becomes seriously entangled in all the emotional issues that public discussion of religion engenders. Lemon was not
intended to promote this dangerous result?=
In analyzing the "primary effectyyprong of Lemon, the district court in McCreary found that placement of the creche in
Scarsdale's Boniface Circle would, in the words of the reviewing
court, "have the direct and immediate effect of advancing relig i ~ n . "Such
~ ~ an application of Lemon, of course, fatally undermines any claim to the use of Boniface Circle for creche display.
Here the Second Circuit rejected the district court's finding
and applied Lynch, pointing out that Scarsdale rras less involved
with the creche than Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which owned and
managed the crgche in Lynch. However, Lynch involved Pawtucket's policy to celebrate, with commercially beneficial over.~
strongly argued the extones, the Christmas s e a ~ o nPawtucket
istence of a secular purpose for the display. Whether this
practice aided religion impermissibly is beyond the scope of this
Commentary. It should be noted, however, that neither a municipal authority with a secular interest in encouraging Christmas
cheers6nor a commercial establishment underwrote the Boniface
Circle creche. In contradistinction to Lynch, the supporters of
the Scarsdale display are churches or their individual members.

A fair reading of the decision in this case reflects the fact that the availnb'ity of
Boniface Cicle to any group mandates its availab'ity under similnr cirmtance3 to all
groups. While Scarsdale may, of course, refuse clearly obscene displn).e, all religious
groups have been placed on an equal footing with all seculnr oqonizntions. The nnture of
the message, as opposed to the form in which it is presented, a p p m to ha bayond the
control of the V i g e . Thus, any religiously based principle may be proclnimed on public
property.
Indeed, the full thrust of Lemon is to prevent the very entanglement rihich the
Second Cicuit permitted in McCreary. See, e.g., 403 U.S. nt 625 ("The Constitution
decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement m d entanglement are
inevitable, lines must be drawn.").
McCreary, 739 F.2d at 726.
a Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
a There is no reason to believe that the Scarsdale authorities were m y lea interested in the welfare of business tenants than w:ere the Pnwtucket officinls.
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It is suggested that when religiously motivated citizens and
churches succeed in placing a religious symbol in a publicly
owned park,s6 the applicability of Lynch becomes ephemeral and
direct and immediate aid to religion as religione7 clearly
emerges.6s
While McCreary, as demonstrated, can be readily distinBoniface Circle in Scarsdale is a park by designation but hardly by common definition of the term. The author visited the park and found it to be no more than a small
resting place in a busy commercial area. Even a small display would, of necessity, dominate the Circle, and would be visible from a large part of the commercial district.
Without questioning the absolute right of the proponents of the creche in Scarsdale both to transmit a religious message and to publicly do so utilizing privatu property,
the author emphasizes his belief that the display in Boniface Circle, a public place, conveyed a clearly religious message. The author queried several storekeepers in the vicinity
of the Circle. One described the creche as a "reminder" of the religious nature of Christmas, another suggested that the display "made people think about something other than
gifts," and a third said that the display showed Scarsdale's "Christmas spirit." This survey is hardly scientific, but even anecdotal accounts may display cr street sense, often
absent from court opinions, about the reality of a long-standing practice.
An argument not raised by Scarsdale is that the establishment clause forbids not
only direct aid to religion but also hostility to religious precepts through governmental
actions. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lynch raises an intriguing possibility for futuro
litigation in the area of governmentally supported public displays of religious symbols.
Quoting an expert witness for the City of Pawtucket who bolstered, before the district
court, the city's argument that the creche had the secular purpose of encouraging people
"to. .let loose with their money," Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.R.I.
19811, afd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the dissenting
Justice in Lynch noted that
[tlhe creche has been relegated t o the role of a neutral harbinger of tho holiday
season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning
and incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it is an
integral part. The city has its victory - but it is a Pyrrhic one indeed.
465 U.S. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
It is reasonably clear that no sponsor of a creche display will or can admit that the
creche is sufficiently secularized to be stripped of its inherent religious symbolism, This
type of argument was successfully advanced in a New Mexico district court, but was
ultimately reversed on appeal. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 528 F. Supp.
919 (D.N.M. 1981). aff'd, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 27,19841, uacated and reversed sub
nom. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 26, 1985) (en
banc).
If the creche is to be viewed as a quintessentially religious symbol, cannot an mgument be advanced that its publicly supported display, which encourages such secular
objectives as boosting seasonal commercial sales, is hostile to the true purposes of religion? This author suggests that the government's linking of a symbol sacred to many
with holiday mercantilism is the k i d of hostile entanglement with religion that is prohibited by Lemon and a long line of first amendment cases. These cases may pormit
incidental benefits for religion through state action, see, e.g., Lynch, but they also restrain the state from hurting the free exercise of religion except for compelling reasons.
Advancing Christmas sales has not been considered such a compelling renson to date.

.
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guished from Lynch, the ultimate doctrinal treatment of public
displays of religious symbols, and in particular Christmas displays, rests upon accepting one of two competing first amendment interpretations. The Lynch majority acknowledged its sensitivity to possible entanglement,BDbut an apparent lack of
widespread public concern predisposed the Court to side with
supporters of this display of religious symbolism. The sensitivity
of the Lynch Court to the historical dimensions of the entanglement problem actually seems slight given Justice OYConnor'sobservation, in her concurrence, that "the crbche display apparently caused no political divisiveness prior to the filing of this
lawsuit, although Pawtucket had incorporated the crbche in its
annual Christmas display for some years."'O The inability of the
Court to recognize the extreme difEculty that many people have
in openly opposing the publicly supported display of a symbol of
the majoritarian creed does not diminish the actual support of
and aid to religion that such displays represent. As Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion in Lynch,
[tlhe import of the Court's decision is to encourage use of the creche
in a municipally sponsored display, a setting where Christians feel
constrained in acknowledging its symbolic meaning and non-Christians feel alienated by its presence. Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred
symbol. Because I cannot join the Court in denying either the force of
our precedents or the sacred message that is at the core of the creche,
71
I dissent

.. . .

The Second Circuit could have rationally supported Judge Stewart in his initial determination that the Scarsdale crbche violated
the establishment clause. Instead, the Second Circuit reversed,
and its decision has not advanced the historic principles of the
first amendment.
C. Aid to Schools

In Felton v. Secretary, United States Department of Edu~ a t i o n , ?the
~ Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, by the
465 U.S. at 687-88.
Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
739 F.2d 48 (2d Ci.1984), a f d sub nom. Aguilnr v. Felton, 105 S. Ct 3232
(1985). See Comment, The Second Circuit and the Establishment Clause: Shoring up a
Crumbling Wall, 51 BROOKLYN
L REV. 642 (1985).
60

70
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, of a taxpayers' suit to enjoin the use of federal funds to
send public school teachers into parochial institutions. The Supreme Court a r m e d the Second Circuit's decision.73
Whatever the increased scope of state involvement with religiohs groups or practices a t the level of higher education might
be," federal courts have remained constitutionally constrained
and institutionally reluctant to relax the barriers where public
Faced with the
school and high school children are inv~lved.?~
inability of parochial schools to provide special services mandated for public school students and with political pressure exerted by the parents of parochial school pupils, various legislatures have attempted to provide such services without crossing
into constitutionally forbidden territory. Most have failed, as
has New York's under the Second Circuit's analysis in Felton.
The New York City Board of Education receives funds from
the federal government through Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act.?=This Act:
declared it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial
assistance to local educational institutions serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve
their educational programs which contribute particularly to meeting
77
the special education needs of educationally deprived children

... .

Educationally deprived children are not to be found solely in the
public schools, and society must bear the responsibility for such
deprivation, regardless of where these children attend school.
Recognizing this, New York school authorities, since 1966, have
sent "public school teachers and other professionals into religious and other nonpublic schools to provide remedial instruction and clinical and guidance service^."^^ Writing for a unanimous appellate bench, Judge Friendly recognized the positive
results of New York's program, even though he ultimately found
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972) (upholding federal grants for
construction of secular facilities at church-a5liated colleges).
" As the Supreme Court noted in Tilton, "[tlhere are generally significant difforences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning nnd
parochial elementary and secondary schools." Id. at 685.
" 20 U.S.C. $3 2701-3386 (1982).
Felton, 739 F.2d at 49.
74

"

Id.
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the program constitutionally imperrni~sible.?~
The establishment clause has been interpreted to mean that
no entanglement with religion is permissible. However, not all
government support services which incidentally benefit a religious group or individual members of a religion are prohibited.
Certainly no one today would argue that fire safety inspections
of parochial schools or lectures to parochial school students by
detectives on how to avoid sexual molestation violate the establishment clause. Constitutional barriers arise as the state's involvement approaches either direct support of the teaching mission of the parochial school or the provision of specialized
teaching by regularly employed educational personneL Thus, by
a bare majority, the Supreme Court has sanctioned a bus fare
reimbursement program which benefited families of both public
and parochial school children.s0 The Supreme Court has also
sustained the lending of textbooks to parochial school students
on the legally and technically rational but pragmatically irrelevant theory that the books in question were "furnished a t the
request of the pupil and ownership remain[ed], a t least technically, in the State. Thus, no funds or books [were] furnished to
parochial schools and the financial benefit [was] to parents and
children, not to schools."81
The Supreme Court has found unacceptable various
schemes for parochial school salary supplementation for teachers
who taught courses of nonsectarian content identical to those offered in public schoolss2 as well as schemes for purchasing of
secular courses from sectarian institution^.^^ The latter arrangement, of course, was nothing more than the funding of secular
courses under a different form of contract.
The Supreme Court's reluctance either to permit the use of
public school teachers in parochial schools or to allow direct
funding of teaching in such schools was well expressed in Lemon
7e Id. at 49-50. (''We have no doubt that the program here under scrutiny hns done
much good and that, apart from the Establishment Clnuse, the City could rensonnbly
have regarded it as the most effective way to carry out the purpose3 of the Act")
Everson v. Board of Educ, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Board of Educ V. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243-44 (1968). Thnt a pupil in nn elementary school would ask to borrow a book from the state sets n new level of nchievement for
creators of legal fictions.
" Felton, 739 F.2d at 55.
Id.

Heinonline - - 5 1 Brook. L. Rev. 633 1984-1985

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

634

[Vol. 61: 617

v. Kurtzmans4 in a statement that continues to guide lower
courts faced with new approaches by local educators and legislators to provide services to parochial schools:
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance
will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed
and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a
teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and
intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between
state and ch~rch.~"

Simple distrust of the impact of a parochial atmosphere on a
teacher, as well as an inability to determine whether the
teacher's own religious beliefs and practices would be less restrained in a po.rochial setting, have motivated the Supreme
Court to decide on the side of caution. The degree of surveillance necessary to ensure that the first amendment is not violated in these situations is not only costly and time-consuming,
but also exacts a toll on teachers' morale and the integrity of
their teaching function.
Relying most heavily on Meek v. Pittenger,s6 the Second
Circuit in Felton pointed out the fatal defects in New York's use
of Title I monies.s7 In Meek, the Supreme Court struck down a
Pennsylvania statute that articulated goals and methods similar
to those of New York under the Title I program. Basically, only
the source of funding was different.86 Proponents of the Pennsylvania scheme argued that services to special students in parochial schools posed a minimal establishment clause problem and,
indeed, did not foster the entanglement forbidden by the first
amendment. Justice Stewart, author of the plurality opinion in
Meek, responded by noting that "the likelihood of inadvertent
fostering of religion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class
than in a medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability
of impermissible conduct is not sufEcient . . .,980

.

403 US. 602 (1971).
Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
421 U.S. 349 (1975).
" 739 F.2d at 60.
" Pennsylvania would have expended state monies to carry out the purposes of tho
state's Act 194. Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-53 & n.2.
Id. at 370-71.
LH
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The Supreme Court's decision in Wolman v. WalterOOalso
buttressed the Second Circuit's position in Felton. In Wolman,
the Ohio statute under scrutinye1 provided for various professional, but not pedagogic, diagnostic services to be performed on
parochial school premises, as well as on private school grounds.
However, the subsequent treatment of individual pupils mas to
be conducted within public school facilities. The Court sustained
the Ohio enactment, finding that the diierence between the role
of the professional diagnostician and that of the teacher in itself
insulated the state program from prohibited entanglemenLDa
Judge Friendly in Felton thus found that the Supreme
Court's prior rulings
lead[] inescapably to the conclusion that public funds can be wed to
afford remedial instruction or related counseling services to students
in religious elementary and secondary schools only if such instruction
or services are afforded at a neutral site off the premises of the religious school.gS

In his painstaking review of the defendant's contentions in
Felton, Judge Friendly resisted defendants' attempts to separate
the New York program from its ill-fated predecessors on the basis of how the New York plan operated.e4 Many of the defendants' contentions regarding the involvement of religion with remedial teaching were highly speculative.e6 It is precisely the
need to employ such speculation to support the constitutionality
of this type of program that, in itself, suggests establishment
clause problems.
Judge Friendly stressed an important point when he ob* 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
OHIOREV. CODEANN. 3 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976).
81

Wolman, 433 US. a t 242. Justice Blackmun likened the role of the dingnosticinn
of psychological or learning disabilities to that of physicians, dentists, and optometrists.
Approval of these and related state services for p a r o c h i school children, to be delivered
on the premises of the religious schools, was granted in Lemon. Id.
Felton, 739 F.2d a t 64.
~4 Id. a t 65-68.The arguments essentially go to the scope and ndequncy of supen5sion of public school teachers in the parochial setting. The city nlso oryed k t because
no harm had been done in the past, this somehow removed the practice from judicinl
S~lUtiny.
85 It is doubtful that any amount of research, statistid or empirical, am remove the
presumption of entanglement found in the Supreme Court's line of cases on aid to paochid schools. The Court has recognized that tenchers can and may respond to the environment of the parochial schooL No amount of supervision, however ~ i e l intended,
l
is
likely to eliminate these risks.
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served that the "appellees' arguments ignore the symbolic significance of the regular appearance of public school teachers in religious s ~ h o o l s . " ~Unlike
~
diagnosticians, whose occasional
presence - even when repeated by the same personnel raises
no authority issues in the minds of children because their mission is clearly discrete, pupils cannot be expected to recognize
role differences among teachers. The existence of a public versus
a private payroll is of no importance to young children. What is
real to them, however, is the regular presence in a parochial
school of individuals whose behavior, demeanor, and expectations identify them as teachers. In the vernacular of New York
streets, pupils can "make" a teacher, regardless of his or her
source of income, and this starts public education down the illdefined but nonetheless slippery slope of prohibited churchstate entanglement.
As the Second Circuit panel noted in its conclusion, after all
the arguments raised in favor of New York's practice are scrutinized, the ultimate reality is that the Felton defendants did not
ask the court to distinguish the case from its predecessors but
rather asked it "to say that Meek was wrongly decided."07 This
the court prudently declined to do. Felton was rightly decided in
an especially well-reasoned opinion which should be cited frequently in this and other circuits as new plans to aid parochial
school children are, inevitably, tested in the courts against the
language, interpretation and application of the establishment
clause. The Supreme Court's affirmance of FeltonQBensures that
the Second Circuit's analysis will have a deserved impact on
those cases.

-

D. And Lastly, Reverend Moon
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Sun Myung
Moon,BB upheld the conviction of the Reverend Sun Myung
Moon on charges stemming from his filing of false income tax
returns. The case was a significant Second Circuit decision
chiefly because Rev. Moon is a controversial and wealthy figure.
739 F.2d at 67.
Id. at 72.
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (closely tracking the Second Circuit
opinion).
718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984).
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Many of the issues raised in Judge Cardamone's opinion,'OO as
well as in Judge Oakes' dissent,'O1 are beyond the scope of this
Commentary. However, the appellants did raise several constitutional issues worthy of brief review.
Moon alleged prejudicial error based on jury instructions
that allowed the jury to find that if Moon used certain monies
from a bank account for his o m purposes, he could not claim
that the funds were in trust for his church.loaMoon argued that
only the church's o m definition of a church use was constitutionally acceptable and binding on the jury.loS The Second Circuit majority disposed of these arguments, pointing out that
[tlhe First Amendment does not insulate a church or its members
from judicial inquiry when a charge is made that their activities violate a penal statute. Consequently, in this criminal proceeding the
jury was not bound to accept the Unification Church's definition of
what constitutes a religious use or purp~se.'~

Moon also raised what the appellate court termed the "socalled 'Messiah' defense."lo5 The gravamen of this claim was
that Moon, as viewed theologically by his followers, mas inseparable from Moon as a legal, natural person.lo6This claim fared
no better than his other novel constitutional theories.

An important first amendment case, In re Herald Co.,""
brought the Second Circuit in line with the Third, Fifth, and
Many issues of substantive criminal law, e.g., sufficiency of the evidence as to
Moon's tax offenses, id. at 1219-23, and propriety of jury instructions with regard to
Moon's criminal intent, id. at 1228, were raised in the appeal.
lo' The dissent is largely concerned with issues of New York trust law. Circuit Judge
Oakes argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury "contnined errors which, because
they were on the crucial issue of the case [whether hloon or the Church ovmed banlr
accounts and stock], must be considered prejudicial." Id. n t 1245. His disputntions centered on: the weight to be given to the donor's intent, id.; whether n " 'denr and unnmbiguous' intent is necessary to create a charitable trust," id. at 1246; and whether it r;as
necessary for the jury to find that the Church had a "specific orgnnizationnl structure" rn
as to be viewed as a beneficiary, id.
loo Id. at 1226.
los Id.
IM Id. at 1227.
lQ6 Id.
log Id. at 1227-28.
734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
loo
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Ninth Circuits108and evolving free press doctrine by recognizing
"that the First Amendment extends some degree of public access to a pretrial suppression hearing."10BHerald Co. arose from
the federal prosecution of Michael Klepfer, who was charged
with making false statements to government investigators and
obstructing justice.l1°
Klepfer sought to suppress oral statements made to federal
investigators,ll1 and also moved to "exclude the public from the
hearing on the suppression motion."l12 The government opposed
Klepfer's motion for a closed hearing, stating that
[tlhe government does not feel that there is any greater threat posed
by the continuance of an open hearing in a case that's already been
made public where there's been a public indictment, there ha[ve] been
newspaper articles and conclusions drawn from the articles and the
public proceedings so far . . 11s

. .

Chief Judge Munson, the trial judge, permitted an attorney for a
newspaper published by The Herald Company to argue against
the motion for exclusion.114Counsel was somewhat handicapped
by the fact that he did not know, nor could he learn, Klepfer's
reasons for seeking exclusion.116Judge Munson then granted the
motion, finding that "the potential for harm to this defendant,
as well as the tainting of any future proceedings by pretrial disclosures, I think outweighs the right of the public a t this time
and the press to attend this hearing."lI6 The Herald Company
appealed both the suppression and sealing of the hearing transcript and related papers, and the court's refusal to provide it,
and the public, with "prior notice of any further actions to ex-

Io8 United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983) (first amendment right of
access applies to pretrial bail reduction hearings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 650
(3d Cir. 1982) (public has first amendment right of access to pretrial suppression, duo
process, and entrapment hearings); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.
1982) (policies underlying public's first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings also apply to voir dire).
log Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 99.
110 Id. at 95.
Id.
' I X Id.
'la Id.
11' Id.
116 Id.
Id. at 96.
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clude the public from proceedings."l17
In its review of prior Supreme Court pretrial closure
cases?l8 the Second Circuit majority119 found that while closure
had been permitted in one instance, it had been found improper
in three others. Circuit Judge N e m a n noted that "the increasing reliance by a majority of the Justices upon the functional
argument strongly suggests that we should recognize some degree of First Amendment access to pretrial proceeding^."'^^ The
court further noted:
It makes little sense to recognize a right of public a c w to criminal
courts and then limit that right to the trial phase of a criminal proceeding, something that occurs in only a small fraction of criminal
cases. There is a significant benefit to be gained from public obsewation of many aspects of a criminal proceeding, including pretrial suppression hearings that may have a decisive effect upon the outcome of
a pro~ecution.'~~

Having determined that some right of access to pretrial proceedings exists, the Second Circuit then formulated the limits of
that right. The court refused "to frame a test for closure of a
pretrial suppression hearing that incorporates the rigorous First
Amendment standards associated with abridgement of free expressi~n."'~~
Judge Nemman observed that, historically, protecting free speech has been the chief concern of the first amendment, and that while a first amendment right of access has also
been developed, it cannot be equated with the central and fundamental right of freedom of speech.'2g
Id.
Id. (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 US. 501 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Nen.~ipnpers,Inc v.
V i i a , 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)).
'lo
Circuit Judges Newman and Winter. District Judge hfnchfnhon, sitting by designation, dissented.
ltO 734 F.2d a t 98.
lX1 Id.
lt5 Id. a t 100.
lPS Id. Little support is given by Judge Newman for his statement thnt "[tlo claim n
value in access to information, even information concerning signitimnt governmental activities, comparable to the value of freedom of expression, is to ignore 200 years of F i i t
Amendment jurisprudence." Id. In any real sense, however, first nmendment doctrine
was born in the courts only in the second decode of the present century. Legal history
aside, the dominant reality today is that access to informntion, especinlly informntion
about government and its activities, is an indispensable prerequisita to any meaningful
free speech about such activities. The right to petition government for n redress of griev1
'

118
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The circuits do not agree on this issue. The Third Circuit
will grant a closure motion only on a strong showing that "other
means will be insufficient to preserve the defendant's rights and
that closure is necessary to protect effectively against the perceived harm."124 The Fifth Circuit requires evidence of "likely
prejudice to a fair trial"125which cannot be cured adequately by
alternatives to closure. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit will permit closure if it "will probably be effective" in
preventing prejudice to a fair trial.'26 The Ninth Circuit has
adopted Justice Blackmun's ~tandard,'~'as articulated in Gannett Co. v. De P a s q ~ a l e , 'whereby
~~
closure must be "strictly
and inescapably necessary to protect the fair-trial guarantee."laD
The standard adopted by the Second Circuit to protect the
limited right of free access to suppression hearings is essentially
a middle-of-the-road approach that rejects the far-reaching standard of Justice Blackmun. Noting that closure is not a step to be
taken lightly,'s0 the Second Circuit articulated a cautiously
worded standard to be applied by trial judges:
[Closure] should be invoked only upon a showing of a significant risk
of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial or of danger to
persons, property, or the integrity of significant activities entitled to
confidentiality, such as ongoing undercover investigations or detection
devices
Though we do not believe that closure must be found to
be the least restrictive means possible to avoid the perceived risk, the
trial judge must consider alternatives and reach a reasoned conclusion
that closure is a preferable course to follow to safeguard the interests
at issue. The closure should be tailored to the circumstances of the
perceived risk
. .The trial judge must articulate the basis for any

....

..

ances similarly requires information, and so much of what government does today will
not come to public attention unless there is a positive and legally enforceable right of
access. Court proceedings, not infrequently a t the pretrial stage, often provido enticing
clues or outright revelations about official acts that the public should know about. This is
not to suggest that government does not have a right to keep secrets or that closure of
pretrial proceedings always violates the first amendment. Rather, there are compelling
practical reasons that the concept of free access should be elevated to the same constitutional dimension as free speech and should be subject to the same restrictions ns speech.
la' United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1982).
la&United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 1983).
la6 Id.
Is' United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
"'443 U.S. 368 (1979).
Id. a t 440.
ISo Herald Go.. 734 F.2d a t 100.
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The standard articulated by the Second Circuit will, in most instances, provide the same resolution of a closure question as the
application of the Blackmun-formulated stricter standard followed by the Ninth Circuit. However, the Second Circuit's position does allow for substantial discretion by trial judges faced
with motions for closure. The caution with which the Second
Circuit majority approached this issue is apparent throughout
its decision in Herald Co., and may have been a specifically tailored counterbalance to the dissent.'s2 While the decision is
functionally and doctrinally an advance for Second Circuit first
amendment jurisprudence, this author suggests that the Second
Circuit majority placed undue reliance on vague and unsupported statements of first amendment history and gave ins&%
cient weight to the realities of contemporary judicial
proceedings.
Justice Blackmun's test in Gannett Co. v. De P a ~ q r u r l eis~ ~ ~
not, as Judge N e m a n stated, a "slightly more rigorous standard,"'* but is instead a fundamental recognition of the centrality of pretrial procedures in contemporary criminal litigation.
Pretrial proceedings often determine whether further proceedings will be held. Official conduct, and too often misconduct,
surfaces at pretrial proceedings, most especially at suppression
hearings. These are matters of great public interest which, as a
practical matter, only the news media can cover effectively. Unlike Justice Blackmun, however, the Second Circuit stopped just
a bit too short of recognizing this reality.

Id. (citations omitted).
The dissent urged a broad understanding of the reasons for closure, ag.,historical practice, prejudicial pretrial publicity, and potential for unrensomble delny, id. nt
10406 (MacMahon, J., dissenting), while ignoring the contempomry shift nwny from closure by the other circuits. Id. at 96-100 (hlachlahon, J.. dissenting).
lss 443 U.S. 368,440 (1979).
Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 99.
lS1
I*
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